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The question how to handle authorization of digital 
identities in a service-oriented architecture (SOA) 
remains an open issue. In this paper we present a 
design pattern for the integration of legacy systems 
with SOA using out-of-the-box (unmodified) 
application servers and discuss how the architecture 
has to be extended by an Identity Management (IdM) 
infrastructure. We claim that the IdM infrastructure 
itself must be designed in a service-oriented way to fit 
into the overall SOA approach. We introduce a 
possibility how to decouple the policy enforcement 
point from the application server and propose an 
architectural design pattern to seamlessly integrate the 
SOA’s business-related functionality and the IdM 
infrastructure. An implementation case study 
illustrates how to apply the invocation pattern for 




Currently most companies use web service 
technologies as their first step towards SOA. However, 
SOA can not be built from scratch but rather the 
functionality of the existing legacy systems and their 
components are being wrapped to web service 
interfaces. This not only eases their integration but also 
enables business analysts to perform so-called 
Programming-in-the-Large, the orchestration of 
business-related services along business processes [1, 
2]. 
The mass and complexity of the existing and 
upcoming specifications in the web service security 
area like WS-Security, SAML, WS-Trust, WS-Policy 
or the Liberty Alliance’s stack proposal make software 
developers often neglect the web service security part 
at first. This is why, as yet, the existing web services in 
most cases have little or no identity management 
features. Hence web service invocations are simply 
“trusted” by default. Complication increases when 
composing several web services which provide 
functionality from different underlying applications. 
To benefit from the advantages of SOA, the 
composition of two or more web services is 
implemented using  the Business Process Execution 
Language (BPEL, [3]). This is where missing identity 
management becomes an obstruction and that is the 
reason why web services should be secured by a 
sophisticated identity management solution [4, 5]. 
The question how to integrate the existing 
applications, especially their internal identity 
management, remains. The migration of existing 
applications to SOA is an important step for the 
protection of the companies’ investments. These legacy 
systems have to be hooked into SOA. To achieve this 
goal, their (mainly) proprietary interfaces considering 
their communication protocols and interface 
description have to be wrapped to WSDL interfaces [6] 
and SOAP communication [7], being the lowest 
common denominator in SOA. Application servers are 
used for this adaption. In the context of SOA the 
application servers are just a means to an end so their 
internal parts should be rather transparent for both the 
software developer involved in the application 
integration and the upper part of the SOA itself. For the 
sake of flexibility, the application servers should be 
interchangeable, at least if staying in the same of the 
two hemispheres: the Java/J2EE world or the 
Microsoft .NET part. Ensuring flexibility and 
transparency at the level of the employed application 
servers regarding the identity management aspects is 
the key driver for the work in this paper. 
In this paper we focus on the core web service layer 
[8] where the application servers reside and where the 
context change from SOA to application specific 
identity management has to take place. A central 
question is where to put the necessary IdM 
infrastructure elements and why. We suggest applying 
design patterns at the core web service layer to solve 
this challenge. In this paper we set up on the design 
patterns secure service proxy (SSP) and intercepting 
web agent (IWA) [9] that will be discussed in chapter 2 
and enhance them for a better fit to SOA. 
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The succeeding chapters are organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 treats the related work in the combination of 
SOA with the authorization part of IdM. The two 
software design patterns intercepting web agent (IWA) 
and secure service proxy (SSP) are introduced and 
discussed. Chapter 3 builds up on these patterns and 
introduces our approach how to add security to web 
services that are implemented using existing (legacy) 
systems with out-of-the-box application servers. In 
chapter 4 the policy enforcement point is focused upon. 
In chapter 5 the application of our approach is 
illustrated using a concrete case study. In chapter 6 an 
evaluation comparing our solution to the existing 
approaches is given. A conclusion and an outlook on 
future work in this area close the body of the paper. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
In [9] security patterns and best practices for 
identity management in the context of web services are 
addressed. Among these there are two patterns 
introduced that have a strong relationship with the 
security layer in SOA: the secure service proxy (SSP) 
and the intercepting web agent (IWA). 
The SSP pattern is suggested to be applied in 
scenarios when wrapping legacy systems as a whole 
for integration purposes and is derived from the 
generic proxy design pattern which is enriched for 
security by forming a policy enforcement point (PEP). 
There are two aspects that have to be thought about: 
First of all, the signatures of the methods in the 
existing system should not change as there is a very 
tight coupling between the proxy and the addressed 
functionality in the system. Whenever there is a change 
in signatures, the proxy itself has to be changed as 
well. Additionally the SSP has to be enhanced (or a 
new SSP has to be created) in case of new methods in 
the backend systems. But the great advantage of an 
SSP is the ability to transform protocols, for example a 
transformation from a HTTP/SOAP to a proprietary 
protocol. This is achieved by the complete decoupling 
of the requesting subject from the requested object. So 
what the SSP does is to cut off all the communication 
from the client, to enforce the corresponding security 
policies by calling its associated policy decision point 
(PDP), optionally to transform the protocol and format 
and then to call the destination method of the legacy 
system. Finally the way back goes as well through the 
SSP which can perform protocol transformation if 
necessary. An important point is that the service 
requestor (subject) does not get in touch with the 
destination service (object) itself at all. If a security 
context for the destination service is needed, this job is 
done by the SSP and masked for the service requestor. 
The strong relationship between the SSP and the 
system to proxy leads to much work in software 
development as the SSP has always to be recoded 
when changes occur in the backend. This does not only 
comprise identity management related functionality, 
but the business-related one as well. That is what led to 
the design pattern intercepting web agent (IWA). The 
idea of the IWA is to act like a “door steward” that has 
never to be replaced when changes at the protected 
services occur. The IWA acts as a PEP which is 
technically speaking realized as a component that is 
hooked into a container like a web server or application 
server as an “entrance” module. There it is added to the 
communication queue and listens to the incoming 
requests. For every request it verifies the authorization 
by asking the corresponding PDP and either lets the 
request pass through or rejects it without letting the 
requestor get in touch with the desired resource. 
Typically this is implemented as a module – like 
mod_access in the Apache web server, or a handler 
within the Apache Axis SOAP engine. Though this 
approach is highly flexible to changes with the 
protected backend services as it does not rely on 
method signatures, the problem is that the IWA is 
strongly bound to a specific application server. For 
each combination of application server and PDP 
(represented quite often in an IdM-Suite), an individual 
IWA has to be implemented considering the 
architecture of the application server which often 
differs strongly. 
In [10], a typical authorization architecture with the 
following logical actors is discussed: The subject (e.g. 
a user) wants to access an object (e.g. an service). The 
authorization architecture (which is part of the identity 
management architecture) involves a policy 
enforcement point (PEP) that takes care of requesting 
authorization decisions and enforcing them. It has to 
intercept the requests of the users and ask the policy 
decision point (PDP) if the user is authorized. The PDP 
evaluates the applicable policies and builds the 
authorization decision (deny / permit) upon that. The 
paper focuses on the realization of the combination of 
PDP and PEP and applies the IWA design pattern. 
There a JAX-RPC message handler for the Apache 
Axis SOAP engine is used, which results in a very 
tight coupling. The major weakness of this approach is 
that for each application server (like JBoss, BEA, …) 
further handlers have to be developed. A strong 
binding to the technology of the application server is 
introduced. 
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3. The Secure Service Agent (SSA) 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, an 
appropriate solution for identity management is a 
prerequisite to establishing service-oriented 
architectures. The central question is where to place the 
necessary IdM infrastructure elements as PEP and PDP 
and why. [9] introduces the SSP design pattern which 
is hard to apply in SOA as it is necessary to generate 
an individual proxy for each method (operation) in the 
existing systems. This is both laborious and 
unnecessary. The IWA design pattern on the other 
hand solves this problem but introduces a very tight 
coupling to the application server where the service is 
deployed. This sets up unnecessary constraints and 
reduces flexibility at the service provider, which is 
fixed to application servers that are supported by the 
developer of the IWA. 
For that reason we decided to combine and enhance 
the existing approaches and to create a design pattern 
that we call “Secure Service Agent” (SSA). It is based 
on the SSP and IWA pattern but the PEP is moved out 
of the internal part of the web or application server and 
both the proprietary and the close binding of the PEP 
to the server itself is reduced. So a central feature of 
the SSA is to achieve the same flexibility as with the 
web service deployment: web services should be 
deployable without change apart from the specific 
deployment descriptor at any application server of the 
same kind (Java/J2EE vs. MS .NET). 
 
Application Server





















Figure 1: Secure Service Agent – Component 
Diagram 
 
Figure 1 describes the relevant elements of this 
approach: 
1. On the right hand side is the legacy system, 
whose functionality is to be exposed via web services 
for easiness of integration and reuse in SOA. 
2. In the middle there is the application server that 
catches the proprietary interface. This is handled by a 
business-related component (BRC) which is deployed 
at the application server and wrapped to a web service 
using the application server’s web service wrapper 
component. 
3. The PEP is developed as a stand-alone 
component that is deployed at the application server. 
As a major difference to the IWA design pattern, the 
PEP is not hooked into the web service wrapper 
component which leads to much work considering the 
adaption to exactly suit for the concrete web service 
wrapper – with hard coded support for the combination 
of security protocols that have to be applied. To give 
an example what problems might arise by doing so: 
Even if staying with the same web service wrapper, 
like Apache Axis for instance, there is the need for 
adoption if the next version is released. Not even to 
think of changing to JBoss or BEA etc. As application 
servers are just a means to an end this is the reason 
why we decided to put the PEP both out of the web 
service wrapper as well as out of the application server 
internal part. This enables flexible deployment at 
application servers within the same basis framework 
(Java/J2EE vs. MS .NET). 
4. The PDP is implemented at a policy server which 
is usually external to the application server and should 
be equipped with a SOA compatible WSDL / SOAP 
interface. Loose coupling and static interfaces enable 
the service-oriented usage with different application 
servers. 
5. The client uses its SOAP engine to communicate 
with the web service. 
 
We focus on the second and third point, the 
definition of the PEP component. We suggest splitting 
up the PEP into two elements. First, a single PEP 
component, that is not fixed to one specific application 
server – this can be achieved by using standard design 
like a stateless session bean (EJB) in the Java/J2EE 
context. Secondly a simple PEP_Invoke, that is 
implemented in each component deployed at the 
application server. As this invocation has a 
standardized and fixed signature, the extension of the 
business-related code to the IdM-related part can be 
done automatically using toolsets in software 
developer’s integrated development environment 
(IDE), to ensure that he is not to be asked for as 
regards content. Putting the IdM relevant parameters to 
the SOAP body offers the chance to bypass the 
proprietary internals of the application server and do 
the IdM handling in the applications server’s “user 
space”. This is a promising achievement as most 
security standards require that all servers in integration 
scenarios have PEP modules which are capable of 
handling the defined combination of security standards. 
We call this design pattern with the split-up PEP with 
small PEP_Invoke and a flexibly deployable PEP 
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component “Secure Service Agent” (SSA) as an 
enhancement of SSP and IWA to web services. 
The following chapter focuses on the combination 
of the PEP component (SSA) and the corresponding 
PEP_Invoke that has to be inserted to the BRCs. 
 
4. The SSA-compliant PEP Component 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, we suggest keeping the 
signature of the PEP_Invoke as generic as possible to 
avoid going back for adapting the security part if 
changes occur and to ensure not to burden the software 
developer but to handle this automatically using tools. 
Considering the BRC component, there is no further 
security shield maintained by the application server. If 
the BRC wants to use the IdM infrastructure, 
instantiated in the PEP and PDP components, it is 
invited to simply add the generic PEP_Invoke into its 
program code. 
The signature of the PEP’s service interface offered 
towards the BRCs has to comprise the following items: 
1. The SOA security token of the subject (usually 
the user). This is the (temporary) session token issued 
to the user at the SOA’s portal after successful 
authentication which is completed in a separate 
process. The token could be a XML-style document 
like a SAML token. 
2. The identification of the object (e.g. the service) 
that is to be invoked. In the web service context this 
has to be at a granularity of operations. The 
identification of the object is needed so that the PDP 
can match it against the policies, if authorization exists. 
To ensure the uniqueness of this identifier, it is 
reasonable to build upon the identifier that is used in 
the service registry (e.g. UDDI). This enhances the 
useful coupling between the registry and the policy 
decision point. 
3. The set of parameters that has been attached to 
the service invocation. This might be necessary for the 
PDP as it is possible that a subject can perform action 
on an object dependant of the applied parameters. This 
enables the evaluation of fine-grained security policies. 
 
There is no need that the business-related 
component itself is capable of identifying, 
authenticating or authorizing the requesting subject. It 
simply has to transparently pass through the given 
information to the PEP component. This ensures that 
the security-related functionality is minimal in the 
business-related component. Furthermore it is 
important to notice that at the BRC the realm of the 
SOA credential ends. If the PDP confirms 
authorization, the BRC is meant to connect to the 
backend system using a technical user’s credentials 
(might be equipped with a higher access level). So the 
authorization part of the backend system is 
externalized to the PDP. 
The following shows an OMG IDL [11] description 






  void PEP_Invoke 
    ( 
    in char[] subject_soa_security_token, 
    in string object_id, 
    in string[] parameters, 
    out boolean authorization_decision 
    ) 
}; 
 
Figure 2 depicts the dynamic aspects of the SSA 
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Figure 2: Secure Service Agent – Sequence 
Diagram 
 
The client sends a request to the BRC. Both the 
business-related parameters, as well as the subject’s 
SOA security token (e.g. temporary session ticket) are 
transmitted from the client to the BRC which forwards 
them, as described above, to the PEP (PEP_Invoke) 
together with its object identification. The SSA then 
verifies the syntactic correctness of the token, first of 
its bare existence then if it has the appropriate 
structure, for instance a SAML assertion or simply an 
array of char / byte. After confirming the syntactic 
correctness, the SSA starts communication with the 
external PDP. The complexity of this web service 
communication was one of the reasons for splitting of 
the PEP into two elements. 
The SSA forwards the subject’s session token, the 
objects identification and the subject’s parameters 
within an XACML statement to the PDP. There the 
actual policy decision takes place, resulting in an 
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XACML answer to the SSA. This answer is then 
transformed by the SSA to a yes/no reply and sent back 
to the BRC. Upon the Boolean answer it either denies 
the request or performs the desired action. 
From the view of the BRC, the PEP_Invoke is quite 
similar to a remote procedure call, with the following 
pseudo code: 
 
if ( PEP_Invoke(  
subject_soa_security_token, 
object_id, parameter[]) == FALSE ) 
{ 
end all operations and exit; 
} 
// business-related functionality 
follows here 
 
As both the BRC and the PEP component reside on 
the same application server, there is no need for 
complex and expensive web service style invocations, 
but internal access structures like RMI can be used, if it 
is a Java-based application server like JBoss. 
 
5. Implementation Case Study 
 
In this chapter the application of the SSA pattern 
within an integration project being pursued at our 
university is presented. We focus on two different 
applications needed in the administration process for 
generating certificates after students have passed an 
exam. One of these two systems is SAP Campus 
Management [12], the higher education component for 
the SAP R/3 enterprise resource planning system. SAP 
CM is internally built up with SAP’s ABAP code stack 
and is not shipped with built-in web services interfaces. 
To get SAP R/3 web service compatible, there is the 
Java Connector (JCo) which is an adapter for Java to 
call SAP’s proprietary interfaces. With SAP only 
deploying JCo, there is the intrinsic limitation to the 
Java framework. This is why the application server in 
our scenario is favored to be Java-based. Because 
established decentralized IT structures are in use at the 
university, the centralized usage of a fixed application 
server for the complete university is not feasible. We 
decided to use JBoss 4.0.3 SP1, a J2EE-conforming, 
open-source application server for deploying the 
business-related component, providing the service for 
the getExamResult() method of SAP CM that was 
deployed as an Enterprise Java Bean (EJB). Combined 
with JBoss comes an adapted version of Apache Axis 
(WS4EE), a web service wrapper component. The 
second application which had to be integrated is a HR 
System of HIS GmbH, which is quite popular at 
German universities but will not be discussed here 
further. It is used to obtain the relevant personal core 
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Figure 3: Case Study – Implementation 
Architecture 
 
Figure 3 shows the implementation architecture. 
The IT-support for the business process of certificate 
creation starts with the Oracle BPEL Process Manager, 
where the BPEL Process provides the 
createCertificate() composed web service. The 
getExamResult web service is called using SOAP 
communication (1). The parameters of the web service 
include the matriculation number of the student whose 
certificate is to be created as well as the SOA security 
token of the invoking subject, which is further passed 
through all SOA layers. These parameters are caught 
by the WS4EE component in JBoss. To keep the 
integration process free of unnecessary bindings to the 
application server, both JBoss and WS4EE are used in 
the out-of-the-box version. The business-related code 
for the getExamResult component was developed in 
advance and finally the PEP_Invoke was added before 
deploying the EJB. Though not being complex for the 
software developer, the last step could be simplified 
using automated deployment tools. When registering 
the getExamResult web service to the UDDI, a UUID 
was assigned that we use as the object_id in the 
PEP_Invoke. After deserialization by the WS4EE 
component, the getExamResult EJB is locally called 
using RMI/JNDI passing through all parameters (2). 
The first step inside the getExamResult EJB is to do the 
PEP_Invoke to the SSA. This call is done using RMI 
as well and passes by the subject’s parameters as well 
as the service’s object_id (3). After a syntactical check, 
it is SSA’s job to marshal this data and to handle the 
web service communication with the external PDP (4). 
In a secondary JBoss, a centralized PDP was deployed 
as an EJB, which is not in the focus of this publication 
(5). The Boolean return value is propagated back via 
the SSA to the business-related EJB getExamResult (6) 
(7) (8). In case of failure, the EJB simply stops and 
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sends back an error message, in case of success the 
functionality of the backend SAP system is called. 
It is important to notice that here the change of the 
user contexts takes place. The SAP system is called 
using a technical user with (almost) full rights to the 
SAP system. This has three major advantages: 
1. The policy decision is evaluated at only one 
place: centrally in the SOA. 
2. If backend systems have a pay-per-user concept, 
it would be necessary to pay for a license for every 
single user that might access the system – in the 
university context this can easily be more than 10,000 
people. 
3. There is no need for password synchronization to 
ensure that the BRC has the correct credentials to call 
the backend system. 
 
Finally the XML-based data is sent back to the 
calling BPEL process (10) (11) (12) that carries on 
with further calls until the final certificate is created. 
 
6. Comparison and Evaluation 
 
With the transparency of the IdM-related security 
information that is simply passed through like 
business-related parameters, there is a high flexibility 
if changes in both application servers as well as applied 
security standards occur. This is why the integration 
project can start without the predefined decision which 
application server is to be used for integration and 
which security standards to apply. 
When comparing the three design patterns SSA, 
IWA and SSP, the first aspect is the flexibility and the 
dependencies of the patterns. Focusing on the 
application server, the IWA hooks into its internal 
processing handlers which leads to a tight coupling and 
in IT environments with different application servers, 
there has to be an individual IWA for each different 
server. The SSA solves this problem by moving out of 
the internal part to the application server’s containers. 
This enables the developing of an SSA component that 
can be deployed in different servers of the same basis 
framework (Java/J2EE vs. MS .NET). The SSP is not 
meant to touch the application server’s internals and 
should be therefore transparent in this respect. 
Taking a look at the applied security standards, it is 
the case that specific IWAs have to be developed for 
the combination of specific application servers with 
specific security standards. Having the need for the 
knowledge of the interns of the application server, it is 
not easy to develop a matching IWA on one’s own 
compared to the SSA where it is sufficient to know 
how to apply the security standards. In this respect the 
SSP is comparable with the SSA. 
The security part of this evaluation is examined by 
looking at the shielding of the business-related 
component. Whilst in the IWA scenario the ‘door 
steward’ is positioned directly at the application 
servers internal queues preventing communication to 
the BRC, in both the SSA and the SSP environment 
communication is meant to pass-through from the 
calling party to the BRC which itself takes care of the 
policy enforcement. It is important to recognize that 
the SSA and the SSP are only concerned with policy 
enforcement - and attacks like denial of service can 
still be detected and rejected by general filters at the 
application server or even before at systems in the 
communication path. 
Having a look at reusability the SSA has great 
advantages over the IWA as it avoids the tight coupling 
to the application server. When staying in the same 
framework like Java/J2EE, it is only needed to change 
the application-specific deployment descriptor to 
deploy the SSA component on a different application 
server. Considering the complexity for the software 
developer of the business-related part, the SSP highly 
burdens as there is a tight coupling between the BRC 
and the legacy application. Each operation is meant to 
be published individually. Both the SSA and the IWA 
do not focus on this. 
When considering performance aspects it has to be 
said that the most expensive operations are not inside 
the three patterns but in the communication to the PDP. 
 
7. Conclusion and Further Work 
 
In this paper an approach how to enforce access 
control in integration scenarios especially when 
migrating existing systems into SOA has been 
presented. Based on the Secure Service Proxy (SSP) 
and the Intercepting Web Agent (IWA) the design 
pattern “Secure Service Agent” (SSA) that is more 
focused to SOA has been introduced and its 
practicability in a case study has been demonstrated. 
The SSA was very useful in a scenario where different 
organizations with heterogeneous IT systems tried to 
integrate their applications using an SOA approach. In 
a divide-and-conquer like process, each organization 
unit tried to make their existing applications web 
service compatible which is a highly individual 
approach. The flexibility in respect to the application 
server on the one hand and the security protocols on 
the other hand allow a great decoupling of the 
business-related aspects and the security ones. 
Software developers of the business-related part think 
about the change of their software artifacts to service-
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orientation without the fear of blocking points at 
security. With the standardized way of interaction with 
the PEP, services can be combined with IdM at a later 
stage. 
The next steps necessary when considering an 
identity management infrastructure for service-oriented 
architectures are to think about the upper layers of 
SOA. On the integration layer and on the process layer 
technologies like BPEL are applied. The question is 
how to secure them or if it is even necessary to secure 
them if the underlying web services are protected? 
Which security specifications fit best at which layers? 
Another area to be investigated is the architecture of an 
SOA conforming PDP – how should it be constructed 
and how can the policies of the underlying systems be 
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